Ощущение не есть факт непосредственного опыта, а продукт абстракции. Ощущение никогда не дается в чистом виде само по себе, до всего: самое первое восприятие <ощущения> содержит ссылку на форму времени и пространства.Здесь имеется ввиду ощущение как акт всприятия?Но в разных областях человеческого духа эти формы имеют разные модальности. Так, пространство в познании организовано иначе, чем в мифах или искусстве. И когда кто-то анализирует эти формы, он должен точно определить, в какой модальности и для какого сорта формы.В самом первом детском лепетании есть четкая разница между группами звуков по сути "центростремительными" и по сути "центробежными". М и Н ясно раскрывают направленность внутрь, а П, Б, Т, Д - обнаруживают противоположную направленность.Ну так это законы организации самого тела задают.Определенные различия в расположении предмета или расстоянии до него выражаются простой сменой согласных и гласных. По большей части, <слабые> гласные обозначают место того человека, к которому обращаются - это "там", а место говорящего обозначается <более острыми> гласными. Что касается согласных элементов, то функция указания на дистанцию почти полностью переходит к группе Д, Т, К, Г и П. В этом отношении индо-германские, семитские и ультра-алтайские языки показывают сходство, в котором невозможно усомниться.Интересно.В определенных языках одно указательное местоимение служит для указания на то, что находится в пределах восприятия говорящего, другое – для указания на то, что находится в пределах восприятия того, к кому обращаются. Или одна форма используется для указания на то, что находится рядом с говорящим, другое – для объектов, равно удаленных от говорящего и от того, к кому обращаются, а третье – для отсутствующих предметов.Для меня в этой теме очень интересно то, как все это прявляется на уровне СубстратногоЗнания.Противопоставление «внутрь» и «наружу» ан которой базируется репрезентация эмпирического «Я», сама по себе является возможной только потому, что в это же время имеется репрезентация эмпирического предмета.: «я» может осознавать изменения своего собственного состояния, только соотнося эти состояния с чем-то неизменным, с пространством и чем-то в нем.И это тоже - каково СубстратноеОтражение?Языки Банту имеют три разные формы указательных местоимений: одно указывает на то, что вещи, о которых говорят, находятся близко к говорящему, второе – на что-то уже известное, что вошло в поле зрения (и мысли) говорящего, и третье – на то, что было удалено из этого поля зрения и больше не является говорящему доступным.Как по другому устрен СубстратБанту вследствие таких языковых особенностей?
I am not an expert, I cannot say that, but definitely their "substrate" is different and the World they are living is significantly different from ours. There is only way to avaluate - to try to imagine the World that could be expressed with such a language.Inga wrote about articles and maby it will be interesting for her I found. There was established that wherever language has produced a definite article, its manifest purpose is to constitute a representation of substance, while its origin pertains to spatial representation. Since the definite article is a relatively late product, such a transition in its function can be plainly seen on many examples. In the Indo-Germanic languages, the genesis and distribution of the article can be followed historically. The article is lacking in Old-Indian, Old-Iranian and Latin, and also in archaic Greek, specifically in Homer; it first came into regular use only with Attic prose. Similarly in the Germanic group, the use of the article was not established until the Middle High German period.Werever the definite article has developed, it can clearly be recognized as an offshoot of the demonstrative pronouns, designating the object to which it refers as "outside" and "there", and distinguishing it spatially from "I" and the "here".The expression of pure action prepares the way for the abstract expression of pure relations. Here again, the representation is closely linked to one's own body. Historical considerations indicate that in certain languages where spatial verbs appear side by side with spatial substantives the nouns are the earlier forms. Verbs are first used to express differences of "sense" in the movement, the difference between movement from a place and movement to that same place. These verbs then appear in attenuated form in the type of suffixes by which the type and direction of motion are characterized. The American Indians languages use such suffixes to indicate whether the motion occurs within or outside of a certain space, particularly inside or outside the house, whether over the sea or over land, whether through the air ot through the water, whether from inland toward the coast, or from the coast inland, whether from the fire site toward the house or from house to fire site. But all these many distinctions based on the source and goal of a motion and the manner and means of its execution, there is one which assumes greater and greater importance for the structure of language. The natural, "absolute" system of coordinates for all representation of motion in language is evidently provided by the situation of the speaker and the situation of the person addressed.Thus one can make a general conclusion (law) that the content and achievement of every spiritual form consist, not simply in reproducing something objectively present, but in creating a new relation, a unique correlation between "I" and "reality", between "subjective" and "objective". In language, as in the other forms, the "road outward" becomes at the same time a "road inward". It is only as its outward intuition becomes more determinate, that its inner intuition can truly unfold: the formation of spatial terms becomes the medium for designating the I and defining it against other subjects.Even the oldest stratum of spatial terms discloses this relationship. In nearly all languages, spatial demonstratives provided the foundation for the personal pronouns. Historically the link between the two classes of words is so close that it is hard to decide which to regard as earlier or later, original or derived.
It is seen that language employed the simplest possible means in forming its original spartial terms. The transportation from the sensuous to the ideal is so gradual that it could be scaresly perceived at first. Thus, fluidity of the dividing line between imitative or affective sounds and the simplest spatial terms and we ancounter the same continuous, imperceptible transition between the linguistic spheres embracing local and temporal determinations that even in modern civilized languages these two often form an inseparable unity. It is common to find one and the same word used to express both spacial and temporal relations. The simple local adverbs are used indifferently in temporal sense, so that, for example, the word for "here" merges with the word for "now", the word for "there" with that for "earlier" or "later".As in the intuition of space, everything is here reduced to the simple distinction of near and far. The only essential difference that is clearly expressed is that between "now" and "not-now": between the immediate present and that which lies outside it. This present should not, to be sure, be conceived as a strict mathematical abstraction but as a psychological "now", encompassing all those contents which can be intuited as an immediate temporal unity, which can be condensed into an elementary unity of experience. This form of primary temporal intuition, the whole of consciousness and its contents falls into two spheres: a bright one, illuminated by the light of the present, and another, dark sphere; and between these two, there are as yet no mediation of transition, no shading or degrees.Developed consciousness, especially consciousness of scientific cognition, does not content itself with this simple opposition of "now" and "not-now", but raises it to its richest logical state. It produced abundant gradations of time, all encompassed in a unitary temporal order in which every moment has its specific position. Epistemological analysis shows that this order is not "given" by sensation and cannot be derived from immediate intuition. It is rather a work of the understanding - particularly of causal inference. It is the categoryof cause and effect which transforms the mere intuition of succession into the idea of unitary temporal order of events.
The development from the feeling to the concept of time reveals three differen stages, which are also of crucial importance. At first stage the consciousness is dominated by the opposition of "now" and "not-now", which has undergone no further differentiations; at the second, certain temporal "forms" - completed and incompleted, continued and momentary action - begin to be distinguished so that a definite distinction of temporal modes is developed; the final stage is characterized by the pure concept of time as an abstract concept of order.In highly developed languages, the specification of time adheres essentially to those parts of speech which express a process or activity. Humboldt also thought that there is a necessary relationship between the specific nature of time conception and of the verb, but in Malay languages were developed a usage indicating that they connect time with the noun. This phenomenon is apparent where language designates time relations by the same means which it has developed for the designation of local relations. Somali uses the variations of vowels of the definite article not only to express differences of spacial position and situation, but also to present temporal differences. Pure nouns, which to our way of thinking embody not the slightest temporal reference, e.g., words such as "man" or "war", can be provided with a certain temporal index by changes of the vowel in their article. The vowel -a serves to designate the temporally present, the vowel -o designates the temporally absent, and no distinction is made between the future and the not yet distant past.The development of child language shows that adverbs of time are formed appreciably later than those of place, and that terms such as "today", "yesteday", "tomorrow" have at first no sharply defined temporal sense. "Today" is the expression of the present in general, "tomorrow" and "yesteday" the future and the past in general. The same one can see in Ewe. Here one and the same adverb serves to designate both "yesteday" and "tomorrow" in general.The Semitic languages start, not with the trichotomy of past, present and future, but with the simple dichotomy of completed and incompleted action. The "perfect", the tense of completed action can be used equally well to express the past and the present, for example it may designate an action which has begun in the past but extends into the present - on the other hand, the "imperfect", which designates an incompleted action in process, can be used for a future, as well as a present or past action. In this linguistic family the pure relative concept of time and the expressions of pure temporal distinctions have achieved their highest development.