Re: ГлубиннаяРеференцияОтнсительно"Я" - ЗапакованнаяСЦ ↑
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Somali has three forms of the article, which are distinguished from one another by the final vowel (-a, -i, and -0). The factor determining the use of one or the other form is the spatial relation of the person or thing in question to the speaker. The article ending in -a designates a person or thing in immediate proximity to the speaker, visible to him and actually seen by him; the article ending in -o refers to a person or thing more or less removed from the speaker but usually visible to him; while the article ending in -i indicateds a person or thing known to the speaker in some way, but not visibly present.
A close connection has been almost universally observed between the expression of spatial relations and certain concrete nouns, among which words designating parts of man's body are most prominent. "Inside" and "outside", "before" and "Behind", "above" and "below" are associated with a specific part of the own body. Where the more highly developed languages tend to use preposition for the expression of spatial relations, the languages of primitive peoples use almost exclusively nouns, which are themselves either names for parts of the body or clearly derived from such names. According th Steinthal, the Mandingan languages express our prepositional concepts in a "very material way": "behind" is expressed by an independent substantive meaning "back" or "rear end", "in front of" by word meaning "eye", while "on" is designated by "neck" and "in" by "belly", etc.
According to Hoffmann, the Japanise has created a word for "I" from a local adverb whose proper meaning is "center" and a word for "he" from another word meaning "there". In phenomena of this sort we see how language draws as it were a sensuous-spiritual circle round the speaker, designating the center of the circle as "I", the periphery as "thou" and "he".
If it is interesting, I can give you more examples.
Boris.
About time perception next time.
Yourts.
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Humboldt thought that language in its development from a primitive to more or less developed state could actualise in a definite specific forms, which really a priori exist in its structure (It is about unpacked values).
What I think about this is more or less articulated in my paper I have send to you. In charpter about theory of systems. If the human spirit is a system of relations (and it really is)then these relations can exists only in and through the definite "mental forms".
To such kinds of forms we can addheir language, scientific cognition, art, myth etc. The structure of such forms is not accidental, it is ruled by the laws of system's construction and development. Thus, human values, despite all their variability, unpredictability and so on, in reality preestablished by the structure of our spirit and laws of its development. From here appears a feeling that these values preexist and as if they were only unpacked before they were not cleimed.
How do you think?
What I think about this is more or less articulated in my paper I have send to you. In charpter about theory of systems. If the human spirit is a system of relations (and it really is)then these relations can exists only in and through the definite "mental forms".
To such kinds of forms we can addheir language, scientific cognition, art, myth etc. The structure of such forms is not accidental, it is ruled by the laws of system's construction and development. Thus, human values, despite all their variability, unpredictability and so on, in reality preestablished by the structure of our spirit and laws of its development. From here appears a feeling that these values preexist and as if they were only unpacked before they were not cleimed.
How do you think?
Sensation is not a fact of immediate experience but a product of abstraction. The matter of sensation is never given purely in itself, prior to all: the very first perception of it contains a reference to the form of space and time. But in different domains of human spirit these forms have different modalities. Thus, space in cognition organized in other way than in myth or in art. And when somebody analises these forms, he must to precisely define in what modality or for what kind of form.
In the very first babblings of children there is a sharp distinction between sound groups of essentially "centripetal" and essentially "centrifugal". The m and n clearly reveal the inward direction, while the explosive sounds p and b, t and d reveal the opposite trend.
Everywhere certain differences in the situation or distance of the object referred to are expressed by a mere change of vowel or consonant. For the most part, the soft vowels express the place of the person addressed, the "there", while the place of the speaker is indicated by a sharper vowel. As for the consonantal elements, the role of pointing to the distance falls almost exclusively to the groups d and t, k and g, b and p. In this respect, the Indo-Germanic, Semitic and Ural-Altaic languages show an unmistakable similarity. In certain languages one demonstrative serves to indicate what lies within the speaker's sphere of perception, another what lies in the sphere of perception of the person addressed; or one form is used for an object close to the speaker, another for an object equally distant from the speaker and the person addressed, a third for an absent object.
The opposition of "inward" and "outward", on which the representation of the empirical I is based, is itself possible only because an empirical object is represented at the same time: for the I can become aware of the changes in its own states only by referring them to something permanent, to space and something in it.
The Bantu languages possess three different form of demonstratives: one indicates that the thing shown is close to the speaker; the second that it is already known, that is, has entered into the speakers's sphere of vision and thought; the third that it is far removed from the speaker and not visible for him.
In the very first babblings of children there is a sharp distinction between sound groups of essentially "centripetal" and essentially "centrifugal". The m and n clearly reveal the inward direction, while the explosive sounds p and b, t and d reveal the opposite trend.
Everywhere certain differences in the situation or distance of the object referred to are expressed by a mere change of vowel or consonant. For the most part, the soft vowels express the place of the person addressed, the "there", while the place of the speaker is indicated by a sharper vowel. As for the consonantal elements, the role of pointing to the distance falls almost exclusively to the groups d and t, k and g, b and p. In this respect, the Indo-Germanic, Semitic and Ural-Altaic languages show an unmistakable similarity. In certain languages one demonstrative serves to indicate what lies within the speaker's sphere of perception, another what lies in the sphere of perception of the person addressed; or one form is used for an object close to the speaker, another for an object equally distant from the speaker and the person addressed, a third for an absent object.
The opposition of "inward" and "outward", on which the representation of the empirical I is based, is itself possible only because an empirical object is represented at the same time: for the I can become aware of the changes in its own states only by referring them to something permanent, to space and something in it.
The Bantu languages possess three different form of demonstratives: one indicates that the thing shown is close to the speaker; the second that it is already known, that is, has entered into the speakers's sphere of vision and thought; the third that it is far removed from the speaker and not visible for him.